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WARREN LERNmE
The history of the doctrine of "peaceful coexistence" in Soviet foreign policy is
inseparable from the history of the doctrine of "world revolution." Throughout its
history, the Soviet regime has acknowledged fealty to both doctrines but varied the
public support for one or the other doctrine according to the objective conditions of
the time. Both doctrines lend themselves to sweeping and varied definitions and defy
standard descripton. However, for the purposes of this discussion, I have taken the
liberty of assigning the following broad definitions to each doctrine: "Peaceful co-
existence," within the Soviet experience, is the policy which acknowledges the exist-
ence of societies antagonistic to the Soviet regime without regarding the destruction
of these societies as the immediate goal of the Soviet state. By the same token, "world
revolution" may be defined as a policy based on the premise that since Communist
society cannot be secure in a "capitalist encirclement," the primary goal of the Soviet
state becomes the destruction of the "capitalist encirclement" and the governments
which compose it.
There has generally been a historical interaction between these two doctrines in
Soviet foreign policy, with the result usually that the practice of one of these doctrines
has been downgraded in order to facilitate the practice of the other at any given
time. Since 1956, "peaceful coexistence" has enjoyed a rather intensified promotion
in Soviet pronouncements on foreign affairs and has officially been proclaimed as the
cornerstone of Soviet foreign policy. At the same time, the very term "world
revolution" has been eschewed, and except for avowals of faith in the determinist
view of the march of history such as Khrushchev's celebrated remark, "Your grand-
children will live under socialism," the concept has not been directly promoted. In
line with this new emphasis on "peaceful coexistence," in I959, Nikita S. Khrushchev
offered American readers a reasonably detailed exposition of the Soviet viewpoint
in the prominent American journal, Foreign Affairs. In his article, Mr. Khrushchev
maintained that the Soviet Union's professsed policy of "peaceful coexistence" was
nothing new, that it had always been the policy of the Soviet regime, and that with
more than forty years of experience in practicing this policy, Soviet professions of
peaceful coexistence should be better received in the West. Going on to prove his
case for the historical permanence of "peaceful coexistence" in Soviet doctrine,
Khrushchev stated:
From its very inception [in 1917] the Soviet state proclaimed peaceful coexistence as the
basic principle of its foreign policy. It was no accident that the very first state act of the
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Soviet power was the decree on peace, the decree on the cessation of the bloody [world]
war.
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The validity of Mr. Khrushchev's historical claim must, to a certain extent, be
reaffirmed. As he points out, immediately after seizing power in Russia, in No-
vember 1917, the Bolsheviks issued a Decree on Peace which inter alia called for
all of the participants in World War I to open immediate negotiations for the con-
clusion of peace. Indeed, Mr. Khrushchev could have added that Leon Trotsky, then
the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, followed this decree by proclaiming an
official doctrine of peaceful coexistence with all peoples. However, to argue the
case of Soviet fidelity to "peaceful coexistence" on the basis of such theoretical pro-
nouncements is to pervert the historical record. What Mr. Khrushchev failed to
mention in his article is the fact that in the early years of the Soviet state the doctrine
of "world revolution" was also loudy proclaimed; in fact, it was "world revolu-
tion" and not "peaceful coexistence" which took precedence in the early formation
of Soviet foreign policy. In the years 1917 to 1920, specifically, the belief in the
imminence of "world revolution," and the obligation of the Soviet regime to aid and
abet this revolution, reduced peaceful coexistence to an occasional slogan, a condition
from which it emerged only when the immediate survival of the Soviet regime was
at stake or other pragmatic considerations made its espousal desirable.
In 1918, Lenin and Trotsky were both convinced that the survival of the Soviet
regime was absolutely contingent upon the outbreak of proletarian revolution in
West Europe and not on "peaceful coexistence." Even in his Decree on Peace,
Lenin implied that the workers of the West were expected to join the Russian
workers in establishing proletarian regimes. Further statements throughout 1918
and i9i9 spoke alternately of hopes and disappointments in the quest for world
revolution. No thought at all was given, at least openly, to the apparent contradiction
in this policy: can you preach and practice coexistence with countries and at the
same time actively support-and with support by no means limited to sympathy-
the overthrow of the governments of these countries? There is, of course, a marked
difference in applauding a revolution and fostering or directing it.
Soviet relations with Imperial Germany in 1918 were an apt demonstration of
this contradiction in Soviet foreign policy. Lenin, in a "peace at any price" policy,
had been forced in March 1918, to accept the Draconian terms of the Treaty of
Brest-Litovsk. Technically speaking, this treaty created a state of "peaceful co-
existence" between Germany and Soviet Russia. Actually the treaty had not been
accepted by Lenin out of ideological beliefs but out of sheer necessity. Nevertheless,
it represented the first manifestation of "peaceful coexistence'--albeit on terms
very unfavorable to the Soviet regime-in practice by the new Bolshevik govern-
ment. However, on October I, 1918, sensing a possible chance for a proletarian
revolution in a Germany whose armies were on the verge of collapse, Lenin wrote
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to Trotsky that the Soviet regime ought to supply revolutionary-minded German
workers with "brotherly union, bread, and military assistance."3  The fact that
Soviet Russia was technically at peace with Germany and allegedly practicing "peace-
ful coexistence" with it apparently did not inhibit Lenin from proposing military
assistance to those who might want to overthrow the German government. The
simple answer was to be found in the confficting interests of world revolution and
peaceful coexistence; in this period, the priority of the former over the latter was
unquestioned.
During the next several months, the Soviet regime was not able to participate
directly in the progress of the German revolution, but this lack of participation was
dictated by geography and the lack of a contiguous border-thanks to the resur-
rection of Poland in 1918-rather than by any qualms about violating peaceful co-
existence.
The high point of the crusade for world revolution, regardless of the consequences,
came in March igi9, when the Communist International was founded at Lenin's
insistence. Though many of the organization's calls to world revolution can be
dismissed as revolutionary rhetoric, the founding of a group whose raison d'etre
was the overthrow of the established governments of the world tarnished the image
of a Soviet regime seeking "peaceful coexistence."
The following year, 1920, put Soviet intentions vis-a.-vis "peaceful coexistence"
to their sternest test. Hitherto, Soviet estimates that the West might accept "peaceful
coexistence" had been substantially clouded by Western intervention in Russia's civil
war on the anti-Bolshevik side. By i92o, most of this intervention was over and
perhaps the Soviet regime was in a better position to consider the realities of "peaceful
coexistence" now that the direct military threat was limited to one anti-Bolshevik
army in the Ukraine. Furthermore, the failure of Soviet ventures in the West had
cooled revolutionary ardor and had made the climate for "peaceful coexistence" a
little more relaxed. However, before any serious consideration of a vigorous policy
of "peaceful coexistence" could take place, Polish legions invaded the Ukraine and
the Russo-Polish War of I92O was launched.
The Russo-Polish War of 1920 was actually the result of a long-smoldering
situation which the Russians had not been anxious to press so long as they were
involved in their own civil war. The Polish invasion, however, gave the Soviet
regime some second thoughts on relations with non-Communist neighbors. Hitherto,
the official policy toward Poland had been one of peaceful coexistence, even if rela-
tions had been difficult. After the outbreak of open hostilities in April ig2o, the
Soviet leadership re-evaluated its official position and came to the conclusion that
under the circumstances "world revolution" was a better policy to apply in this
situation. Hence the Soviet goal in this war became not merely to defeat Poland
but to install a Soviet government in Poland. Thus, after the Poles had been
driven back, Red Army units crossed into Poland and immediately installed a
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Revolutionary Committee in the Polish city of Bialystok, openly recognizing this
committee as the future Soviet government of Poland. The various pronouncements
by leading Bolsheviks, especially by Marshal Tukhachevsky,4 avowed that the goal
of the Red Army was to create a Soviet Poland and beyond that spread the world
revolution as far as possible. For a while it appeared that Soviet efforts might be
successful, since by August i92o, the Red Army was in sight of Warsaw. Only a
sensational and daring defense of the city by the Polish general, Josef Pilsudski,
frustrated the attempt to convert Poland into the second Soviet state in the world.
Failing to take Warsaw, the Red Army offensive lost its momentum and the Poles
now drove the Russians back to White Russia. Both sides agreed to an armistice in
September, followed by the Treaty of Riga of 1921. The first attempt to spread the
world revolution by military force had failed.
The failure of the Russian drive on Warsaw was perhaps the greatest impetus
toward the adoption of a policy of "peaceful coexistence" by the Soviet regime. What
impressed Lenin was not the military aspect of the defeat but the fact that the
proletariat of Poland fought not on the side of the Bolsheviks but on the side of its
own "bourgeois" Polish government. It was this failure of the Red Army to impose
a Soviet regime on Poland in 192o and not, as Khrushchev maintains, the Decree on
Peace of 1917, that gave birth to the serious pursuit of "peaceful coexistence."
That Lenin himself had finally recognized that "world revolution" was not im-
minent is implicit in his assessment of the Russo-Polish War, contained in a speech
on foreign policy which he delivered in Moscow on October 2, 1920:
If Poland had become Soviet ... the entire international system built by the victors [of
World War I] would have been destroyed .... However, it turned out that although
events are moving inexorably toward the workers' revolution, they are still moving too
slowly as compared to the rapidity of events in Russia.5
While Lenin had previously conceded difficulties with various revolutionary situa-
tions, hitherto he had consistently expressed confidence in the immediate potential
for world revolution. With the failure of the Polish campaign, the period of the
militant quest for world revolution had come to an end; and it now became expedi-
ent to put into practice the doctrine of "peaceful coexistence."
The chief practitioner of the newly revived doctrine of "peaceful coexistence" was
the polished and skillful Georgi Chicherin, since mid-1918 People's Commissar of
Foreign Affairs. So successful was Chicherin in marketing the image of "peaceful
coexistence" that by 1925 every major country in the world, with the notable exception
of the United States, had extended diplomatic recognition to the Soviet regime.
With some countries, notably Weimar Germany, Chicherin not only established
peaceful relations but extensive trade contacts as well. Yet at the same time, the
Communist International, an organization of Communist Parties of the world, con.
tinued to pursue an active policy of world revolution, promoting revolutionary
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putsches in Germany, Bulgaria, and China-albeit with rather ludicrous results.
Although the Communist International was supposedly devoid of any control by
the Soviet regime, it was based in Moscow, led and controlled by Bolsheviks, and
its major strategy determined by Lenin and his Politburo. If the Communist
International, with rather open Bolshevik control, actively sought the overthrow of
foreign governments, could the Soviet Union be said to be pursuing a policy of peace-
ful coexistence? The question became somewhat academic in the latter half of the
i92os when, after Lenin's death and the ascendancy of Stalin over Trotsky, the Com-
munist International became a far less active organization whose meetings became
rarer and rarer and whose members' major preoccupation became purging dissidents
rather than capitalists.
If the first major step in making "peaceful coexistence" a Soviet policy came with
the end of the Russo-Polish War, the second major step came with Stalin's intro-
duction of the doctrine of "socialism in one country." This doctrine, first introduced
by Stalin in 1924, and adopted by the Soviet Communist Party in the wake of
Stalin's triumph, substantially downgraded the importance of world revolution.
"Socialism in one country" involved such a total commitment of Soviet resources in
the home country that "peaceful coexistence" not only became feasible but highly
necessary. During the period of the first two Five Year Plans, that is, 1928-1938, the
Soviet Union did all it could do to enhance the impression that it had no ambitions
beyond its borders and was distressed lest anyone else have such ambitions. With
the emergence of a Nazi regime in Germany in 1933, the Soviet Union, with its
Foreign Office now under the direction of Maxim Litvinov, sought international
respectability in the West as ardently as they had sought world revolution in the
early years of the regime. The Soviet Union joined the League of Nations (a
deliberate manifestation of support for "peaceful coexistence"), signed defense pacts
with Western nations, and unlike the 192os refrained from foreign adventures-
although it could not resist meddling in the Spanish Civil War. This policy was
all well and good for the cause of "peaceful coexistence," but what of "world revolu-
lution?" Had Stalin in more or less pursuing peaceful coexistence more or less
abandoned world revolution? From his exile in the West, Trotsky indicted Stalin
for moving the goals of Soviet foreign policy "from world revolution to the status
quo."
An explanation of the new Soviet policy was offered to the outside world by one
of Stalin's chief publicists, Karl Radek. In an article in Foreign Affairs,6 offered as
official interpretation of Soviet doctrine, Radek emphasized the willingness of
the Soviet Union to seek peaceful relations with all powers and downplayed as much
as he could the theme of world revolution. As for the latter doctrine, Radek offered
the rather apocalyptic view that once workers in other lands had seen the triumph
of "socialism in one country," they would seek to emulate the Soviet example.
Considering Radek's earlier background as a rather militant-and sometimes
irresponsible-advocate of revolutionary action, the dim and far-off-and maybe
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never-view of world revolution went far to establish the official priority of "peaceful
coexistence" over "world revolution."
Actually, for some purposes, Stalin had done too good a job of selling "peaceful
coexistence" and in some respects had seemed to confirm Trotsky's charge that
Stalin had betrayed "world revolution." In 1938, through the medium of his public
letter to one Comrade Ivanov, Stalin reaffirmed his faith in eventual "world
revolution":
Hence the support of our revolution by the workers of all countries, and still more, the
victory of the workers in at least several countries, is a necessary condition for fully guaran-
teeing the first victorious country [U.S.S.R.] against any attempts at intervention and
restoration, a necessary condition for the final victory of socialism 7
The outbreak of World War II in 1939 forced a complete re-evaluation of Soviet
foreign policy. Stalin, after protecting himself with a non-aggression pact with
Hider, still had the opportunity to follow a path of "peaceful coexistence" had he so
desired. Quite to the contrary, however, 1939 effectively marked a major inter-
ruption in the Soviet practice of "peaceful coexistence." The Soviet record from
1939 to 1941-a period when the Soviet Union was officially neutral in World War
I-was marked by military aggression against Poland, Romania, the Baltic States,
and Finland; and resulted in the militant spread of Bolshevism to all of the Baltic
States and portions of other states. This policy was interrupted by the German in-
vasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 and the dire military plight of Russia for the
next few years. Once the German military threat was repulsed, however, Soviet
foreign policy renewed its militancy of the 1939-1941 period and again converted the
Red Army into an instrument of world revolution. As the Red Army marched
westward, it brought in its wake Soviet governments, exported from Moscow to
take over the countries of East Europe. "Peaceful coexistence" was on the Soviet
agenda only after the Moscow-exported governments were installed in power.
From the end of World War II until Stalin's death in 1953, it was difficult to take
Soviet professions of "peaceful coexistence" seriously; the record in East Europe
seemed to indicate a policy much more concerned with "world revolution."
With Stalin's death, Soviet relations with the West became more stable than
they had been since 1939. Once again, the prospects for further military expansion
dimmed. The 195os appeared to be a more suitable time for consolidating gains
than for new conquests. As in the past, the doctrine of "peaceful coexistence" was
now trotted out and loudly proclaimed. Khrushchev may have claimed that he was
only continuing the eternal policy of the Soviet state, but more serious reflection will
indicate that be it under Khrushchev, Stalin, or Lenin, "peaceful coexistence" has been
adopted by the Soviet Union as a pragmatic measure and not as an inherent belief.
"World revolution," on the other hand, is inherent in Communist doctrine; and
should the international situation offer new opportunities, it might again supplant
"peaceful coexistence" as it has in the past.
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